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AMERICAN LAW AS ART:                                             
AN AESTHETIC JUDGMENT 
ABE C. HESTER* 
ABSTRACT 
If legal documents are literature, and all art can be assessed via 
aesthetic theories, what insights can aesthetic theory grant us about 
increasing access to United States Code? That question is what this Note 
seeks to address. This Note begins by explaining the foundations of aesthetic 
theory, explaining the origins of the term, and contrasting two early 
approaches to aesthetics developed by Alexander Baumgarten and 
Immanuel Kant, respectively. Then, after arguing that legal codes are a 
form of legal literature, the Note uses Dennis Dutton’s aesthetic universals 
and Kant’s aesthetic principles to develop a framework for judging a legal 
code as an artwork. Finally, the Note compares United States Code with the 
United States Constitution to try and discern why the latter is more 
appreciated than the form, with the hope that such an interrogation can help 
us reformat United States Code into a more accessible, and ultimately more 
interesting, legal work.   
INTRODUCTION 
This paper critiques the aesthetic appearance of United States Code 
through the lenses of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgement and Dennis 
Dutton’s universal signatures in human aesthetics.1 It will explore the 
broader implications of Humean, Kantian, and other modern and 
postmodern aesthetic theories on how we view codified law and what that 
means for legislators seeking to increase accessibility to the law.2 Finally, 
The paper will compare and contrast United States Code with the 
 
 
* Executive Articles Editor, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D. Candidate, 
Washington University School of Law, Class of 2021. B.A. in Political Science & Integrative Studies 
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1.  Dennis Dutton, Aesthetic Universals, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO AESTHETICS 
203 (Berys Gaut & Dominic Lopes eds., 2nd ed. 2001).  
2.  DAVID HUME, ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL, LITERARY (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Fund 
rev. ed. 1987); IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT (Werner S. Pluhar trans., Hackett Pub. ed. 
1987). See, e.g., WLADYSLAW TATARKIEWICZ, A HISTORY OF SIX IDEAS: AN ESSAY IN AESTHETICS 
(1980); GREGORY LOEWEN, AESTHETIC SUBJECTIVITY (2011). 











Constitution of the United States to discern if aesthetic reform may be a 
plausible means to increase legal accessibility in the United States, a 
pressing concern during a period of continued mass incarceration.  
Few have used aesthetic theory to make judgments on authoritative, 
binding law. Adam Gearey’s Law and Aesthetics approaches the topic 
broadly, relying on “Neitzchean imperatives” and arguing primarily that we 
must adopt a more creative approach to lawmaking, seeking to boldly 
develop a theory that will “repair the ruptures of thought.”3 Gearey’s theory 
serves as a foundation for the more pointed argument made herein: the use 
of a consistent system of aesthetic judgment explains why certain legal 
documents or codes are generally more appreciated and accessible than 
others.4 Published the same year as Gearey, University of Colorado School 
of Law Professor Pierre Schlag developed his own theory of aesthetics of 
American Law, relying on descriptive rather than normative theories of 
aesthetics that explicitly rejected “[the] idealization of aesthetics and . . . 
romanticization of law.”5 His approach stands opposite to the one taken by 
this paper. His theoretical categories of “the aesthetic of the grid,” “the 
energy aesthetic,” “perspectivism” and “the dissociative aesthetic” do, 
however, serve as useful tools when exploring how to recraft the American 
code of law in a manner which better emulates aesthetic universals.6 Other 
authors7 have undertaken the provides a unique practical application of 
aesthetic theory to solve the problem of American law’s inaccessibility.8 By 
assessing the aesthetic value of United States Code and the Constitution 
with clear aesthetic criteria, it is feasible to instrumentalize their positive 
aesthetic attributes and scrutinize their negatives to transform how we 
present United States Code to the American public.  
 
 
3.  ADAM GEAREY, LAW AND AESTHETICS (2001).  
4.  For example, the Constitution is often praised as a work of genius whereas much of 
Congress’ work is viewed as messy or difficult to understand. Eric Lane & Michael Oreskes, Excerpt 
from the Genius of America: How the Constitution Saved Our Country and Why It Can Again, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2007, 12:06 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/excerpt-from-the-
genius-o_b_75561 [https://perma.cc/44S4–7B29]; Olga Khazan, Why People Find Obamacare So 
Confusing, ATLANTIC (Jan. 2, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/01/why-people-
find-obamacare-so-confusing/282747/ [https://perma.cc/ZG5D-FXVL].   
5. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (2002). 
6.  Id. 
7.  See, e.g., DESMOND MANDERSON, SONGS WITHOUT MUSIC: AESTHETIC DIMENSIONS OF 
LAW AND JUSTICE (2000); LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF 
LAW (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999); LAW AND AESTHETICS (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1992).  
8.  See, e.g., Neil Rose, Making the Law Accessible for All, GUARDIAN (May 25, 2010), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/may/25/public-legal-education-rights [https://perma.cc/2XJU–
2A6B]; ‘Our Justice System Has Become Inaccessible to Millions of Poor People,’ Says Dean Martha 
Minow, HARV. L. TODAY (Oct. 29, 2014), https://today.law.harvard.edu/justice-system-become-












I. WHAT IS AESTHETICS? 
To begin an aesthetic criticism of American legal documents, two 
antecedent questions must be resolved: whether such documents are art at 
all and how we can assess art. The word “aesthetic” has taken on a colloquial 
meaning: something “aesthetic” is “designed to give pleasure.”9 Adopted by 
internet denizens, hip journalists, and underground music fans, the term has 
evolved beyond its strict academic origins. In popular usage, the term 
simply means something is “artistic” or, alternatively, “pleasing in 
appearance.”10  
The term’s modern usage is suggestive of its origins. From the Greek 
αἰσθητικός (aisthetikos), this word originally conveyed only that something 
was “of or for perception by the senses or perceptive.”11 Modern aesthetics 
tends to be more generally understood as something capable of appreciation. 
It is clear why contemporary journalism has latched onto the term. To be 
aesthetic is to be pleasing to the senses. To be pleasing to the senses is to be 
beautiful. Beautiful music, literature, and art occupy special places in 
 
 
9.  See, e.g., Soliel Ho, What Is Spoopy? Your Guide to the Internet’s Favorite Halloween 
Aesthetic, S.F. CHRON (Oct. 26, 2019, 1:28 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/culture/article/What-is-
spoopy-Your-guide-to-the-internet-s–14562973.php [https://perma.cc/FY9M-RS58]. 
10.  See, e.g., r/aesthetic, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/aesthetic/ 
[https://perma.cc/7BFR–8N33]; Andrea Crowley, 15 Cozy Bedrooms that Nail the Farmhouse Aesthetic, 
YAHOO LIFESTYLE (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/15-cozy-bedrooms-nail-
farmhouse–144335879.html [https://perma.cc/EHA7–3FFC]; EYM, C H I L L V I B E S | Chill & 
Aesthetic Music Playlist, YOUTUBE (Jun. 22, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJnF5VxTO5g 
[https://perma.cc/UP2T-R4QX]; Joshua Edmunds, Meme Music: An Abridged History of Vaporwave, 
DAILY TARGUM (Oct. 4, 2019, 12:09 AM), https://www.dailytargum.com/article/2019/10/the-history-
of-vaporwave [https://perma.cc/3B9L-KBTE]; Chris Richards, I Was Wrong About Young Thug, THE 
WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2019, 3:20 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/i-was-wrong-
about-young-thug/2019/10/23/87e88fbc-f5b7–11e9-ad8b–85e2aa00b5ce_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/3XNC-FLAY] (“Young Thug is taking his victory lap . . . . Five years ago, the Atlanta 
native was positioning himself as the most vivid expressionist rap had ever heard, a virtuoso with bold 
aesthetic strategies and bottomless ingenuity.” (emphasis added)); James Parker, Neil Young’s Boring, 
Prophetic Message to Readers, ATLANTIC (Sept. 28, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2019/09/neil-young-feel-music-evolved-and-half-
assed/599044/ [https://perma.cc/LVT2-EV55] (“Young, on the other hand, writes books like he makes 
records with his on-off band Crazy Horse—which is to say, according to a highly evolved and very 
disciplined aesthetic of half-assedness.” (emphasis added)); Anne Midgette, Neglected Visionary Agnes 
Denes Altered Our Landscape with Her Art, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2019, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/museums/neglected-visionary-agnes-denes-altered-
our-landscape-with-her-art-at–88-shes-finally-getting-her-due/2019/10/24/19577434-f4d4–11e9-ad8b–
85e2aa00b5ce_story.html [https://perma.cc/A43W-HQRW] (“The result is too complex to be easily 
described; but it’s undeniably beautiful, and it shows something about the ways in which humans 
construct systems of knowledge and the way that knowledge itself can become an aesthetic creation.” 
(emphasis added)); Aesthetic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/aesthetic [https://perma.cc/XGC5-JEKS].  
11.  Aesthetic, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/aesthetic [https://perma.cc/GP9Y-M4CX]. 











American culture. Art journalists and tastemakers seek to both find and 
determine what others should spend their limited time perceiving. Our 
senses are finite; therefore, we should maximize our time perceiving things 
that are the most pleasing. While this definition seems to be the most 
consistently used throughout history, philosophers, as with all things, 
sought to interrogate the why of aesthetic pleasure. Two distinct 
philosophical derivative definitions developed between the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.  
German poet Alexander Baumgarten defined aesthetics as “criticism of 
taste.”12 Credited with giving the philosophical discipline its name in 1735, 
Baumgarten broke from tradition and argued that artwork is more than a 
medium—a piece of art is “a locus of perfection in its own right.”13 He 
argued that what makes something aesthetic is that perception of the object 
leads to a rich and imagery-intensive clarity rather than an analytic one.14 
He sought to sever aesthetic appreciation from the other form of sense 
appreciation: one which only provides objective clarity.15 Unlike an 
analytical appreciation of a work which would only value an object’s 
comprehensibility, aesthetic appreciation focuses on valuing 
representations which result in feelings of “liveliness . . . brightness or 
splendor”.16 To judge the aesthetic quality of something, we must consider 
not only its intuitive perfections and imperfections but the symbolic as well. 
Perfection must be perceived by the senses rather than purely through 
intellect.17 Finally, he argues that aesthetic-sense-based judgement exists as 
a parallel, rather than as a counter, to logical analysis and that the goal of 
 
 
12.  ALEXANDER BAUMGARTEN, MEDITATIONES PHILOSOPHICAE DE NONNULLIS AD POEMA 
PERTINENTIBUS §§ 116–117 (Wayback Machine 2010) (1735), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20101005090921/http://modernsource.daphnet.org/texts/Baumgarten/Bau
MPh [https://perma.cc/E4MC-UW8E] (“[L]et them therefore be νοητά the know Philosophers, in order 
in his thoughts, in this manner, on the one side in the question put to them no fortunes, or very few of 
the special rules to be observed. The outermost parts of do not cares for the things, which are of sound 
is that of articulate, to that extent, for they belong to the αἰσθητά. Of these not have a more sensitive, 
submitting to the account is held, on the one side the aesthetics of the part of the question put to them it 
would be longer, than of logic. Now, when this can be done completely and incompletely, that would 
teach rhetorical general knowledge of imperfect representations of sensory setting after it Poetry general 
knowledge about the complete setting displays sensitive kind ledge of the faculty of a higher object of 
the Logic; αἰσθητά, ἐπιστήμης αἰσθητικῆς or aesthetic”); ALEXANDER BAUMGARTEN, AESTHETICA, §1 
(1750) (“Aesthetics (the theory of the liberal arts, the logic of the lower capacities of cognition 
[gnoseologia inferior], the art of thinking beautifully, the art of the analogon rationis) is the science of 
sensible cognition.”); see also 18th Century German Aesthetics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 16, 
2007), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetics–18th-german/#BauMeiAesAnaRatCog 
[https://perma.cc/E2PZ-LGD7]. 
13.  18th Century German Aesthetics, supra note 12. 
14.  Id. 
15. Id. 
16.  Id.  












aesthetics must be the “perfection of sensible cognition . . . [to find beauty] 
such that . . . ugliness [can] be avoided.”18 Baumgarten died before ever 
finishing his magnum opus, but his enumeration of the perfections19 
suggests that he sought to develop an objective system of aesthetic criticism.  
Immanuel Kant provided the other relevant definition of aesthetics in 
the same period as Baumgarten. Kant defined aesthetics as of or pertaining 
to the appreciation of the beautiful.20 Contrary to Baumgarten, who sought 
to develop an objective system of aesthetics, Kant largely focuses on our 
subjective experience of perception. Kant outlines four kinds of “aesthetic 
reflective judgements,” arguing that “the feeling of pleasure an object 
[grants] must be classed with either the agreeable . . . the beautiful . . . the 
sublime, or the (absolutely) good.”21  
To be agreeable, an existent must simply be associated with positive 
sensation. It is based on mere enjoyment and “[does not contribute to 
culture].”22 To be good, a thing must elicit a powerful moral feeling or be 
 
 
18.  BAUMGARTEN, AESTHETICA, supra note 12. 
19.  Id. at §22 (“ubertas . . . magnitude . . . veritas . . . claritas . . . certitudo et vita cognitionis”).  
20.  KANT, supra note 2, at xlix, 214, 175, 44 (“The antinomy I have set forth and settled here 
is based on the concept of taste in the proper sense, i.e., as an aesthetic power of judgment that merely 
reflects; and I reconciled the two seemingly conflicting principles [by showing] that they may both be 
true, and that is all we need. If, on the other hand, we assumed, as some do, that the basis determining 
taste is agreeableness (because the presentation underlying a judgment of taste is singular), or, as others 
would have it, that it is the principle of perfection (because the judgment is universally valid), with the 
definition of taste formulated accordingly, then the result would be an antinomy that we could not 
possibly settle except by showing that the two opposed (but opposed [as contraries,] not as mere 
contradictories) propositions are both false; and that would prove the concept underlying both of them 
to be self-contradictory. So, we see that the elimination of the antinomy of aesthetic judgment proceeds 
along lines similar to the solution of the antinomies of pure theoretical reason in the Critique [of Pure 
Reason], and we see here too—as well as in the Critique of Practical Reason—that the antinomies 
compel us against our will to look beyond the sensible to the supersensible as the point [where] all our 
a priori powers are reconciled, since that is the only alternative left to us for bringing reason into harmony 
with itself”) (“[E]very art presupposes rules, which serve as the foundation on which a product, if it is 
to be called artistic, is thought of as possible in the first place. On the other hand, the concept of fine art 
does not permit a judgment about the beauty of its product to be derived from any rule whatsoever that 
has a concept as its determining basis, i.e., the judgment must not be based on a concept of the way in 
which the product is possible. Hence fine art cannot itself devise the rule by which it is to bring about 
its product. Since, however, a product can never be called art unless it is preceded by a rule, it must be 
nature in the subject (and through the attunement of his powers) that gives the rule to art; in other words, 
fine art is possible only as the product of genius . . . .”) (“[A] judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment 
and so is not a logical judgment but an aesthetic one, by which we mean a judgment whose determining 
basis cannot be other than subjective . . . .”).  
21.  Id. at 126. 
22.  Id. (“The agreeable, as an incentive for desires, is always of the same kind, wherever it 
may come from and however different in kind may be the presentation (of sense, and of sensation 
regarded objectively). That is why what matters in judging its influence on the mind is only the number 
of stimuli (simultaneous and successive), and, as it were, only the mass of the agreeable sensation, so 
that this sensation can be made intelligible only through its quantity.” (emphasis added)). 











of a law that “obligates absolutely.”23 To be beautiful, an artifact must be 
the near opposite of something merely agreeable. It must have an 
intelligible quality that “contributes to culture, [and] teaches us . . . to be 
mindful . . . and purpose[ful] in the feeling of pleasure.”24 Finally, to be 
sublime, something must be relatively beautiful or appreciable based on a 
community of interest: this means it must have some quality reflected in 
nature that brings it near universal appreciation.25  
For Kant, even universality takes on an oxymoronically subjective tone: 
“we are compelled,” he argued, “to subjectively think nature itself in its 
totality as the exhibition of something supersensible without our being able 
to bring this exhibition about objectively.”26 Beauty and sublimity are, 
respectively, ways to describe what we judge by our senses as pleasing in 
accordance with our general interests and that which we like “directly” 
despite the interest of our senses.27 This seemingly contradictory 
understanding comes from the Kantian notion that underlying everything 
there is an “ought,” which is represented by a sensus communis, or a 
community of taste.28 Although Kant’s aesthetic is subjective, underneath it 
 
 
23.  Id. at 126–27 (“[A thing that is good] is distinguished above all by its modality a necessity 
that rests on a priori concepts and contains not just a claim but also a command that everyone approve. 
Actually, the absolutely good belongs not to aesthetic but to pure intellectual judgment; by the same 
token, we attribute it to freedom rather than to nature, and in a determinative rather than in a merely 
reflective judgment. But the determinability of the subject by this idea—the determinability, indeed, of 
a subject who can sense within himself, as a modification of his state, obstacles in sensibility, but at the 
same time his superiority to sensibility in overcoming these obstacles, which determinability is moral 
feeling-is nevertheless akin to the aesthetic power of judgment and its formal conditions inasmuch as it 
allows us to present the lawfulness of an act done from duty as aesthetic also, i.e., as sublime or for that 
matter beautiful, without any loss in the feeling's purity, while such a loss would be unavoidable if we 
sought to bring the feeling into a natural connection with the feeling of the agreeable . . . .”). 
24.  Id. at 126.  
25.  KANT, supra note 2, at 126 (“The sublime consists merely in a relation, for here we judge 
the sensible [element] in the presentation of nature to be suitable for a possible supersensible use.”). 
26.  Id. at 128.  
27.  Id.  
28.  Id. at 159–160 (“We often call the power of judgment a sense, when what we notice is not 
so much its reflection as merely its result. We then speak of a sense of truth, a sense of decency, of 
justice. etc. We do this even though we know, or at least properly ought to know. that a sense cannot 
contain these concepts, let alone have the slightest capacity to pronounce universal rules, but that a 
conception of truth, propriety, beauty, or justice could never enter our thoughts if we were not able to 
rise above the senses to higher cognitive powers. [This] common human understanding, which is merely 
man's sound ([but] not yet cultivated) understanding, is regarded as the very least that we are entitled to 
expect from anyone who lays claim to the name of human being; and this is also why it enjoys the 
unfortunate honor of being called common sense (sensus communis), and this, indeed, in such a way that 
the word common (not merely in our language. where it is actually ambiguous, but in various others as 
well) means the same as vulgar—i.e., something found everywhere, the possession of which involves 
no merit or superiority whatever. Instead, we must [here] take sensus communis to mean the idea of a 
sense shared [by all of us], i.e., a power to judge that in reflecting takes account (a priori), in our thought, 
of everyone else's way of presenting [something], in order as it were to compare our own judgment with 












all he still finds that we have a drive towards universal beauty or sublimity. 
Rather than try and delineate what exactly universals are, as Baumgarten 
did, Kant leaves this determination to nature.29  
Summarizing: Baumgarten sought to distill taste into categories to 
perfect our aesthetic criticism and understanding. Alternatively, Kant 
believed that aesthetic judgements were born of natural perfection, and we 
should therefore try to understand why we have such intuitions.  
Both aesthetic approaches remain pervasive because of their utility in 
explaining art’s chronic question: why is one thing valued more than 
another thing? 
II. LAW AS ART 
 Modern aesthetics has subsumed both aforementioned definitions of 
aesthetics and tries to grapple with both the normative and descriptive 
questions of art. Modern aesthetic theory tries attempts to define what art is 
and what makes a piece of art good, establishing both of these criteria is key 
to fundamentally changing our approach to legal access.  
Professor Robert Ferguson argues in The Judicial Opinion as Literary 
Genre that judicial writing is “a distinct literary genre within the larger 
[American] civic literature.”30 Ferguson focused on appellate judicial 
opinions, which are a necessary consequence of American legal codes 
which are often open to interpretation.31 While legal opinions are clearly 
distinct from statutory schemes, his interest in expanding American “civic 
literature” opens the possibility of treating any written civic work as a form 
of art.32 Additionally, he comments on the utility derived from treating the 
law as literary art, arguing that law too can be assessed via “method, theme, 
and approach,” like any other piece of literature.33 Professor Gearey’s article 
argues similarly that law can be appreciated and treated much like other 




and private conditions for objective ones, an illusion that would have a prejudicial influence on the 
judgment.”). 
29.  For clarity, this is my assessment of Kant, not his explicit commentary on Baumgarten. 
30.  Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 
202 (1990). 
31.  The necessity here comes from ambiguity: any ambiguous legal term must at some point 
be given consequence by a learned judge or justice.  
32.  Ferguson, supra note 30, at 202.  
33.  Id. at 201. 
34.  Ann Mumford, Law and Aesthetics, 29 J.L. & SOC’Y 3, 528 (2002) (citing ADAM GEAREY, 
LAW AND AESTHETIC 8 (2001)). 











The above authors make the point that it is arbitrary to sever the law 
from the realm of aesthetic criticism. This point is legitimate because art is 
defined as “works produced by human creative skill and imagination.”35 
Statutory codes are clearly works produced by human skill and imagination. 
Although many laws are borne out of the basic principle that harm to others 
ought to be avoided, legislators often labor over how to extend such a basic 
principle into complex areas of modern society dealing with things like 
securities fraud, identity theft, or extortion by public officers.36 This creative 
process results in complicated statutory schemes that are commonplace in a 
global legal landscape. Furthermore, the means to reaching the legislative 
enactment often involves impressive displays of oration, negotiation, and 
readings of popular children’s books, all eternalized in legislative history.37  
This artistic process, and the artifacts it creates, are at least in form 
similar to teams of writers coming together to make literature, producers 
and directors coming together to create films, and musicians coming 
together to create music. The practical nature of statutes and other legal 
works does not dilute the creative value or use of creativity in their 
production. United States Code, as the official compilation of the fifty-three 
titles of United States statutory law, is—by extension—necessarily a 
collection of artifacts and is, itself, a work of art.  
Some statutes, like some works of art, are derivatives of others and 
accordingly considered less creative. Regardless, bad art is still art. While 
art that fully imitates another piece of art is plagiarism, such plagiarisms are 
still pieces of art, albeit art which should be qualified as inexact examples 
of a good thing. Accordingly, the artistic quality of some object should not 
be used to determine its status or categorization as a piece of art. Simply 
put, if something was not art in the first place, adjudging its artistic value as 
bad or good would be impossible. 
 
 
35.  Art, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/art .  
36.  See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO 
BUSINESS ETHICS 197–213 (D.M. Messick & A.E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028, 872, 
1348; Ryan Grim, The Actual Laws Trump Has Broken, Just With The Ukraine and China Affairs, Could 
Land Him 10 Years In Prison, INTERCEPT (Oct. 10, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/10/10/trump-
crimes-law/ [https://perma.cc/T4DF-F5X2]; Washington Post, LeBron James: Daryl Morey’s Tweet 
Supporting Hong Kong Protests Was ‘Misinformed’, YOUTUBE (Oct. 15, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c8lRtcw0HOQ [https://perma.cc/GB7U-E7GJ] (“Whether that 
harm be financial, physical, or spiritual.”). 
37.  Senator Cory Booker, Cory Booker Speaks on Senate Floor about GOP Health Care 
Repeal Plan, YOUTUBE (July 28, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pMQ_vm5nM60 
[https://perma.cc/JC5Y-BH4D]; WWLP–22News, House-Senate Conference Committees Negotiate 10 
Bills, YOUTUBE (July 23, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pjP35UAob_U 
[https://perma.cc/C2JG–5NHN]; Associated Press, Raw: Sen. Cruz Reads “Green Eggs and Ham”, 













Even critics of the romanticized or traditional aesthetic approach to 
legal criticism (such as Professor Pierre Schlag) still maintain that value 
exists in assessing the aesthetic merits of legal works.38 Schlag fears that the 
use of traditional aesthetics will “subordinate” aesthetics to the law, doing 
the discipline symbolic violence.39 Schlag argues instead that aesthetic 
judgement of legal works requires a novel approach:  
[T]o suggest . . . that law is an aesthetic enterprise can . . . seem 
cavalier, ethically obtuse, even cruel. We are confronted with the 
disturbing possibility that law paints its order of pain and death on 
human beings with no more ethical warrant or rational grounding 
than an artist who applies paint to canvas . . . I . . . affirm - these 
ethical concerns and moral judgments here . . . . [T]he notion of 
aesthetics I . . . invoke is neither confined to the realm of art nor 
preoccupied with questions of beauty. Mine is a broader and more 
permissive, though also less conventional, conception of aesthetics.40 
Regardless of the method, he argues that “legal aesthetics are important 
because they help constitute law and its possibilities in different ways . . . 
[t]o be under the sway of an aesthetic is . . . to perceive law in a certain way 
. . . to encounter certain tasks and perform certain kinds of actions.”41 
Schlag’s method, providing a new form of aesthetics not “preoccupied with 
questions of beauty,”42 is too removed from popular conceptions of aesthetic 
value to breach the fortress of academia. Miring aesthetic theory in the 
academic makes it impossible to develop policies that can increase 
accessibility to those most affected by the law. Instrumentalizing aesthetic 
judgements allows us to reimagine our code of laws as not only an artifact, 
but also an art that occupies an important romantic place in the popular 
consciousness.43 
III. WHAT MAKES ARTWORK GOOD?  
 Even after developing a basic understanding of aesthetic theory, 
analyzing legal documents in this novel manner requires a foundation 
providing a basis upon which to assess artistic value. The question of what 
 
 
38.  Schlag, supra note 5, at 1049–50. 
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42.  Id. at 1050.  
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art is good art continues to cause heated debate since Baumgarten and Kant 
first bifurcated academic aesthetics in the eighteenth century. The question 
is admittedly a difficult one, but in this paper two methods shall be utilized 
and contrasted: analysis of United States Code via Kant’s four aesthetic, 
reflective judgements and Dutton’s six aesthetic universal signatures.44  
 Denis Dutton was an American Philosopher of art who served as a 
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. 
Dutton wrote extensively on aesthetic judgement and authenticity in art, 
coining the nominal/expressive authenticity dichotomy.45 Additionally, he 
believed and wrote extensively that artistic appreciation was not subjective 
or culturally learned but instead developed via a host of evolutionary 
adaptations.46 
Unlike Dutton, Kant considered art beautiful if it could express aesthetic 
ideas.47 Appreciating a piece of fine art, Kant argued, would evoke the same 
feelings as looking at nature.48 Kant explained that fine and aesthetic art is 
art that “is one whose standard is the reflective power of judgment rather 
than sensation proper.”49 Essentially, the aesthetic qualities of something 
are those that provoke reflection upon the inexplicable and irrational 
feelings we typically associate with art and beauty. According to Kant, the 
kinds of aesthetic ideas represented in an artwork relate to the four aesthetic, 
reflective judgements which are comfortably settled in the subjective 
response of a person to artwork.50 
Dutton, in contrast to Kant, but much like Baumgarten, sought to find 
universality and objectivity in aesthetic judgement and human responses to 
artwork.51 Dutton enumerated aesthetic universals—in the tradition of 
Baumgarten’s Aesthetika—which deliver a framework for aesthetic 
criticism less tied to the individual subject.52 Dutton’s six universal aesthetic 
 
 
44.  Dutton’s six aesthetic universals function similarly to Baumgarten’s perfections and will 
serve as an extension of Baumgarten’s thought for this paper’s purposes since Baumgarten’s work was 
never completed. 
45. Ray Sawhill, The Gleeful Contrarian, SALON (Nov. 3, 2000), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20080307112136/http://archive.salon.com/tech/view/2000/11/03/dutton/in
dex.html [https://perma.cc/N44L-R542]; DENISDUTTON.COM, http://www.denisdutton.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/25LM-8R9B]. 
46.  DENISDUTTON.COM, supra note 45.  
47.  KANT, supra note 2, at 55–56. 
48.  Id. at 145–181. 
49.  Id.at 173. 
50.  Id. 
51.  See Denis Dutton, Aesthetics and Evolutionary Psychology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
FOR AESTHETICS (Jerrold Levinson ed., 2003), 
http://www.denisdutton.com/aesthetics_&_evolutionary_psychology.htm [https://perma.cc/EGJ5-
4YCV]. 
52.  See Denis Dutton, Aesthetic Universals, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO AESTHETICS 












signatures are expertise (or virtuosity), non-utilitarian pleasure, style, 
criticism, imitation, and “special” focus.53  
Expertise to Dutton is very similar to Kant’s notion of genius. Dutton 
described expertise as “[t]he [facet of the] manufacture of the art object or 
execution of the artistic performance [that] requires the exercise of a 
specialized skill. This skill may be learned . . . Technical artistic skills are 
noticed in societies worldwide and are generally admired.”54 In other words, 
Dutton argues that humans have some subliminal appreciation for highly 
skilled work and this affects how we appreciate art: the higher the perceived 
skill expression, the higher the appreciation of the art.  
Non-Utilitarian pleasure is similar to the idea (still persistent in 
contemporary pop art criticism) that art for art’s sake is valuable beyond 
whatever practical benefit it may provide. Dutton explained this facet as the 
“art object . . . viewed as a source of pleasure in itself, rather than as a 
practical tool or source of knowledge. The embodiment of the artwork may 
be in some respects useful: a tool (e.g. a shield or a knife) or a means to 
transmit information (e.g. a sacred poem). Aspects of the embodiment, 
however, give pleasure in experience aside from these practical or 
information/communication considerations.”55 The non-utilitarian pleasure 
of an ornate pistol, for example, would derive from the attractive gold inlaid 
in its handle and not its capability to shoot and to kill.56 
Style is the recognizable strands that connect seemingly disparate works 
of art within the limits of their genre or medium. Dutton described style as 
the aspect of “[a]rt and performances, including fictional or poetic 
narratives, [that relate to] recognizable styles, according to rules of form and 
composition.” This external aspect to works of art is spectacularly important 
from a cultural perspective. Style is what can be taught by art experts to their 
pupils. To critics, it is the most recognizable aspect of a piece of art . 
Something too confined by the norms of the rules of its style is viewed as 
derivative; something completely severed from its stylistic framework is 
unrecognizable. Recognizing and working within the boundaries of style is 




[https://perma.cc/Y2KA-8HRB]. It should be clear that although Dutton argues that there is universality 
in why we find some art more pleasing than other works, he does not orient himself as a communitarian. 
Instead, he believes that culture has a negligible impact on what artwork is found beautiful by the 
community and our appreciation can be explained by our biology.  
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Criticism may well be rephrased as the ability of a piece to be criticized. 
A piece of art that can be criticized in a language recognizably related to the 
form of art it represents allows the diffusion of its value among a cultural 
group and, more broadly, humanity as a whole. Artifacts completely foreign 
or novel, although intriguing due to their ability to reflect other facets of 
Dutton’s critique, fail to materialize benefits derived from being part of the 
system of a culture’s critical language. Simply put, Dutton outlined this 
criterion as representing the “indigenous critical language of judgment and 
appreciation, simple or elaborate that is applied to arts.”57 His examples 
“include the shop talk of art producers or evaluative discourse of critics and 
audiences.”58 
Imitation is close to the Kantian sublime, the part of the artifact that 
reflects an aspect of the real or imaginary world. Dutton finds imitation in 
art that can be found in “widely varying degrees of naturalism, art objects, 
including sculptures, paintings, and oral narratives, represent[ing] . . . real 
and imaginary experience of the world.”59 These calls to nature and 
idealism, Kant and Dutton would agree, hold a special place in the human 
fascination with art. Dutton takes it further than Kant, however, finding that 
this imitation is something innately and fundamentally human. He argued 
that: 
The differences between naturalistic representation, highly stylized 
representation, and nonimitative symbolism is generally understood 
by artists and their audiences. (Blueprints, newspaper stories, 
pictures, passport photographs, and road maps are equally imitations 
or representations. While imitation is important to much art—notable 
exceptions being abstract painting and music—its significance 
extends into all areas of human intellectual life.)60 
The final, and most unique, aspect of Dutton’s analysis relates to the idea 
that art with universal appeal must also occupy a special focus. An artwork 
must be, or be perceived to be, distinct from the day-to-day objects that 
permeate the cultural landscape. In the same way that gems are worth more 
when scarce, an artwork that is difficult to blur into the mundane fascinates 
humans more than one that feels ordinary. Dutton outlines this idea by 
highlighting that “works of art and artistic performances are frequently 
bracketed off from ordinary life, made a special and dramatic focus of 
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experience.”61 Dutton qualifies “while there are plenty of mundane artistic 
objects and performances (such as decorated parts of Baule looms, or 
communal singing done to pass the time while mending fishing nets)” that 
“every known culture has special art works or performances which involve, 
what Ellen Dissanayake calls, ‘making special.’”62 In essence, some of 
“these [artistic] objects or performance occasions are imbued with intense 
emotion and sense of community” that mundane artwork is not.63 
Unlike Kant, who derived his theory using reason alone, Dutton built 
his theory on a comparative analysis of historical and contemporary cultural 
approaches to art.64 Dutton argues that “art itself is a cultural universal” and 
“there are no known human cultures in which there cannot be found some 
form of what we might reasonably term aesthetic or artistic interest. . . or 
artifact production . . . .”65 Dutton criticized generally the lack of belief 
reflected in Kant’s Critique of Judgment,66 arguing that a necessary 
implication of Kant’s concept of sensus communis was a demand for 
universality. This demand goes beyond the purely logical idea that aesthetic 
appreciation of beauty relies on an individual’s demand of “universal 
agreement from the rest of mankind” for their own taste.67 
Although it is possible that a latter-day Kant would have come to 
conclusions similar to Dutton’s if he had shared a similar interest in modern 
social science, Dutton’s heavy reliance on psychology and anthropology 
explains why he sought to distinguish himself from subjective or rationalist 
aesthetic thinkers.  
Unlike Kant, who believed that the subjective value of something comes 
from static criteria that reflect his four aesthetic principles, Dutton attaches 
external factors to aesthetic critique, all the while insisting upon their 
universality. For example, he points out that novelty is a controlling factor 
in how humans perceive works of art, opining that “the tenth mouthful of 
an interesting and delicious food will not be as piquant as the first” and “ten 
Vivaldi concertos in a row may well prove tedious.”68 Therefore, Dutton’s 
framework may serve as a better foundation to criticize and improve upon 
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an artifact than Kant’s. As with many things in the law, however, it is 
necessary to approach a problem with a toolkit built from many different 
canons rather than arbitrarily relying upon one.69 A multiplicity of methods 
will grant greater surety that the settled conclusion is the best one. 
Therefore, this paper will rely on both below. 
IV. KANT’S FOUR AESTHETIC PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO U.S. LEGAL 
DOCUMENTS 
While Kant’s aesthetic principles lack the straightforward method of 
Dutton’s universals, it is not impossible to view United States Code and 
other legal artifacts through a Kantian lens. To provide clarity, the United 
States Constitution will be used as a control in this analysis, given its 
established place in American jurisprudence.70 
Kant’s first principle, agreeableness, is distinct from his other principles 
by not being a distinctive feature of “fine art.”71 Agreeableness is more 
reflective of base responses in the human mind than the other principles. 
The more sensory responses generated by a thing, the more agreeable it is. 
Although Kant may not have approached sensory response in the same way 
that modern science does, it is useful to understand that sensory responses 
are typically categorized by the sense that triggers them: sight, taste, touch, 
aural, and smell. Therefore, the basic question is, what kind of sensory 
responses does United States Code trigger? 
Theoretically, United States Code and the Constitution trigger similar 
sets of sensory responses, as they are both physical texts. Both trigger the 
visual response of seeing leather bound pages; the tactile response of 
running fingers against (often) aged, thick sheets of paper; the aural 
response of hearing the oomph of slamming a book shut; the smell of old 
libraries or hip bookstores; and both probably taste terrible.  
 
 
69.  See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICES, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS (2008).  
70.  Jeffrey Toobin, Our Broken Constitution, NEW YORKER (Dec. 2, 2013), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/09/our-broken-constitution [https://perma.cc/6CK2-
UH9M] (“Obama, who taught constitutional law for more than a decade at the University of Chicago 
Law School, wrote, ‘The outlines of Madison’s constitutional architecture are so familiar that even 
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. . . Most politicians consider the validity of the Constitution off limits as a subject for debate. The 
Constitution, and the structure of government that it established, provides the backdrop, but never the 
subject, for every controversy.”).  













In practice, however, most people will likely never see, much less 
interact with, a physical copy of United States Code. The annotated version, 
available on Amazon and published by West, is priced at $1,735.72 
Individual volumes of the fifty-three titles are available from the United 
States Government Bookstore for $159 each.73 The Constitution, by 
contrast, is available in its entirety on Amazon for $6.95.74 The Government 
Bookstore has the Declaration of Independence and Constitution bundled 
for $1.50, and the analysis and interpretation of both documents is available 
for $36.75  
All that is to say: the Constitution is an easily accessible document 
(often given away for free by advocacy organizations, student groups, 
schools, and other civic-minded organizations) whereas United States Code 
is often accessed most often in its digital form due to price, unwieldiness, 
and difficulty to obtain.76 The agreeableness of the Constitution, from a 
sensory response’s by-the-second perspective, is dramatically higher than 
that of United States Code. Even the digital version of the Constitution is 
likely more agreeable, because many online reproductions include images 
of the original constitution adding variety in font, background color, etc., 
that the digital form of United States Code fails to offer.77 This issue of 
inaccessibility reflects both questions of artistic value and systemic fissures 
in openness of the law in the United States. Art is intentionally created and 
instrumentalized. The fact that the Framers and ongoing architects of the 
 
 
72.  United States Code Annotated, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/United-States-Code-
Annotated-Group/dp/9992415150/ref=olp_product_details?_encoding=UTF8&me= 
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Constitution sought and continue to seek to make the Constitution 
universally revered and accessible speaks by analogy to the weak efforts to 
develop a more agreeable United States Code. The practice of giving even 
children physical versions of the Constitution assures that the tactile, 
retentive, and other sensory benefits of ensuring the Constitution is an 
agreeable piece of art are amplified and continue to increase constitutional 
literacy. The same cannot be said about United States Code.78 
As Kant puts it, however, being agreeable is not necessarily better.79 
“All free art is ‘aesthetic,’” but only that which elicits a response by one’s 
higher cognitive faculties (reason) is fine art.80 So while United States Code 
may fail on being generally agreeable due to its inaccessibility, it may all 
the while be a finer piece of art than the Constitution. To determine whether 
it is fine, we look to the remaining three principles: goodness, beauty, and 
sublimity.81  
To be good something must “obligate absolutely.”82 An artifact that is 
good “is distinguished . . . by a necessity . . . but also a command that 
everyone approve” of what it suggests or puts forth.83 A symbol of the 
morally good, upon interaction, triggers a reasoned or “pure intellectual” 
response demanding conformity to the artifact’s higher strictures.84 While 
there is less clarity here than with the mechanical understanding granted 
from sensory responses, the American legal system has, nearly since its 
conception, recognized that codified law does not “obligate absolutely.”85 
Challenging the law and testing whether or not statutes enacted by Congress 
pass constitutional muster is a necessary facet of the balance of powers 
between the judicial and the legislative branches of the United States 
government.86 United States Code, therefore, causes Americans to feel 
obligated to follow the law only insofar as that law does not seem 
unconstitutional.87 Additionally, the general idea that many American laws 
may be unethical (e.g., marijuana criminalization) suggests that many of 
those who interact with United States Code as an artifact reject, 
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intellectually, that United States Code is representative of moral or ethical 
correctness.88  
By contrast, the Constitution, although amendable and open to 
interpretation, is still considered both the final word on legality, obligating 
lawmakers and citizens of the United States to follow its words absolutely 
and is viewed as an example of goodness in and of itself.89 The Constitution 
has cemented its place as an example of good governance and an ethical 
framework throughout the modern and post-modern era.90 The United States 
Code, while mimicked in part by other countries, does not receive this same 
universal acclaim. Furthermore, many statutes in United States Code are 
frequently ridiculed or condemned by both American citizens and foreign 
nations as both immoral and anachronistic. Therefore, in terms of eliciting 
an intellectual response of moral obligation, United States Code fails 
miserably, partly due to its perceived inferiority to the Constitution, but also 
simply because of the imperfect state of American statutes; the average 
person is just as likely to have an interest in challenging the law as they are 
to follow it.91  
While United States Code is neither good nor agreeable when 
compared to the Constitution under a Kantian perspective, it may still 
exemplify ideas of beauty in the minds of reasoning onlookers.92 To better 
assess this, Kant’s beauty can be broken down into three criteria: first, does 
the artifact contribute to culture?; second, does the artifact encourage 
mindfulness?; and finally, does the artifact promote reflection upon the 
purposefulness of the feeling of pleasure it grants?93 
For the first criterion, the answer is a measured yes. United States Code 
contributes rather heavily to American culture in a direct, though not always 
positive way. United States Code codifies many federal initiatives which 
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strive to address issues Americans face for the better and reflects attempts 
by lawmakers to create a certain level of societal and cultural consistency 
through law that rarely happens organically (due to the differing goals and 
priorities of the many state governments).94 Additionally, without the 
draconian and unjust laws that the United States Code enshrined, major 
instantiations of American protest culture (captured through music and 
visual art) would never have developed.95 Therefore, in terms of raw cultural 
impact, United States Code has a profound element of beauty underlying it. 
Essentially, United States Code is a vessel of pressure on the American 
cultural consciousness because of what it represents and how it is enforced. 
In terms of purely legal cultural change, however, it is rivalled by other more 
impactful documents and codes. However, it is difficult to argue that even 
the Constitution is more “beautiful” in this sense to an American when 
considering that not many other works can affect what Americans can 
legally view on our televisions, officially recognize our heroes’ births as 
holidays, or determine what kinds of drugs we can use.96  
 The remaining two criteria are not exemplified by United States Code. 
Due to the Code’s inaccessibility, it is often misunderstood, and a 
misunderstood legal code does not encourage mindfulness in its onlookers. 
Although attorneys, lawmakers, and judges may have to be particularly 
mindful when approaching United States Code due their vocational 
responsibility to both interpret and apply it, the Code’s lack of broader 
community impact means it is outmatched by the Constitution and other 
more broadly accessible legal works in ability to encourage mindfulness in 
a Kantian sense. At the same time, the art of constitutional interpretation is 
one that has birthed books, opinion articles, and entire specialty areas in the 
law despite its comparatively brief length. This means the Constitution has 
elicited far more mindfulness than United States Code especially given its 
significantly shorter length.  
Kant’s final principle here asks if United States Code,—despite being 
disagreeable, not good, and lacking in beauty, is nonetheless sublime. The 
answer is unclear, but using the Constitution as a benchmark, the answer is 
likely no. To be sublime, the Code must reflect something in nature that 
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causes near universal appreciation.97 United States Code does seem to draw 
upon something natural from the societal experience. Since the Babylonian 
Empire, most nations have made some attempt to codify their laws.98 Even 
children without a working concept of legality or ethics begin to construct 
a basic understanding of right, wrong, fairness, blameworthiness, and 
punishment.99 Organizing society through a system of legal order is a 
fundamental and persistent feature of social organization.100  
United States Code, however, is evocative of something more specific 
than the fundamental underpinnings of society: the dysfunctional, cruel, and 
often deadly American criminal justice system.101 The call for justice 
(particularly criminal) reform in the United States is not new and is 
something that both the American political left and right agree upon.102 To 
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fulfill Kant’s vision of sublimity, an artifact must manifest a physical 
representation of something brilliant (for example: a painting of “Jupiter’s 
eagle with the lightning in its claws” represents a “logical attribute” of the 
“mighty king of heaven”) whereas the United States Code is more likely to 
be viewed as a representation of the pervasive unfairness perceived by many 
Americans when they think in depth about the American justice system.103 
By having the reputation of being unapproachable, inaccessible, and unfair, 
United States Code fails to foster community appreciation, thereby falling 
short of sublimity by a considerable margin. Contrasting the Constitution, 
the general reverence displayed toward that artifact exemplifies how a legal 
document can fully exemplify sublimity—constitutional rights, often 
understood to be forms of fundamental fairness in the United States, are 
evoked by most Americans upon viewing the Constitution. This community 
appreciation is tied inextricably with the Constitution’s codification of 
Enlightenment ideals, which is not that far from Kant’s attribution of 
sublimity to an image of Jupiter’s peacock for effectively representing 
“statel[iness]”.104 
Kant’s Critique of Judgement provides an interesting, albeit impractical 
approach to applying aesthetics to a legal work such as the Code. The 
centrality of the individual’s subjective appreciation of an artifact (despite 
some reliance on community appreciation) stymies efforts to 
instrumentalize Kant’s aesthetic principles for legal reform efforts.  
V. DUTTON’S SIX AESTHETIC UNIVERSALS APPLIED TO U.S. LEGAL 
DOCUMENTS 
Dutton’s six aesthetic universals based on cultural psychology and 
developed with the goal to outline an objective approach to aesthetic 
understanding does not fail the instrumentalization test like Kant’s. As 
above, United States Code will be contrasted with the Constitution, both as 
a control and to highlight the differences in Kant and Dutton’s approaches 
when applied.  
Dutton’s first universal is expertise or virtuosity. Expertise is 
recognized in “all technical areas of human activity . . . from cooking to 
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public oratory to marksmanship” and other disciplines not traditionally 
viewed as art.105 The observation that humans commonly appreciate 
technicality and expertise is useful because it ends the severance between 
why we like art and why we like anything else. This helps to clarify what 
“signal characteristics” of United States Code (or other legal works) must 
be changed to increase appreciation of such works.106  
United States Code represents varying degrees of expertise. There is no 
doubt that some statutes are better written than others, that some regulations 
are frustratingly ambiguous, and that some laws are so poorly conceived as 
to be totally immoral. How then should we assess the expertise of United 
States Code as a single artifact? It seems that the only practical assessment 
is by considering whether the thing that makes United States Code separate 
from its many statutes is particularly virtuosic. That is, does the way United 
States Code organizes the many, often disparate, statutes within it represent 
the expertise of the Office of the Law Revision Counsel (“OLRC”) in a 
manner deserving universal or objective praise?107 
According to the OLRC, the purpose of United States Code is “to 
develop and keep current an official and positive codification of the laws of 
the United States.”108 United States Code is not the primary source of 
American law, but is instead a representation of the permanent law of the 
United States with the twenty-seven titles enacted into positive law 
receiving the status of “legal evidence,” much like the United States Statutes 
at Large.109 To become positive law, a Statute at Large is restated in a clearer 
and better organized manner, and any obsolete portions are removed.110 This 
means the primary goal of the OLRC is to better clarify and reformat 
existing law, as well as to make it more accessible in terms of linguistic 
clarity, readability, and online availability. Considering that since 1974 only 
twenty-seven of the fifty-four (or fifty-three, not counting the reserved Title 
Fifty-Three) titles have been codified as positive law, the task seems 
daunting to an outsider. Under Dutton’s criteria of expertise, it is clear that 
United States Code stands for the expertise of those undertaking the project 
of codification, and therefore the Code as a work of art exemplifies this 
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expertise, despite misgivings about the specific content within. The skill 
required to revise the often archaic language and poor organization of 
Statutes at Large highlight the technicality of the Counselors who have 
undertaken such a task and suggest that they have “a knack for” statutory 
construction and revision that other officials lack.111  
The Constitution, of course, is often praised for being expertly drafted. 
An author for the BBC referred to it as “a superb example of Enlightenment 
philosophy in pragmatic form . . . [and] elegantly written and succinct.”112 
The author of that same article mentions, however, that reverence for the 
Constitution exists in spite of its flaws because it symbolizes “a national 
ideal.”113 The Constitution, therefore, may very well be considered less 
representative of Dutton’s expertise—while the technical skill required by 
the Counselors who undertake the codification of Statutes at Large is 
manifest, our ability to assess the Constitution’s technicality as Americans 
may be too clouded by our cultural bias to offer an objective reading of the 
document as a work of art.  
Dutton’s next universal, non-utilitarian pleasure, is similar to Kant’s 
beauty. Does the artifact grant pleasure beyond its benefits as a practical 
tool or source of knowledge? United States Code does not seem to embody 
this idea of aesthetic pleasure for its own sake. Much of this analysis would 
be the same as when analyzing the sensory pleasure of the Code or when 
considering its beauty. By failing to be accessible, and by failing to have 
some additional cultural purpose beyond codifying the law, it fails to evoke 
non-utilitarian pleasure. The reverence for the Constitution, both as 
embodiment of a national ideal and as a succinct emblem of American 
values, does evoke this universal. The Constitution has a following greater 
than any other piece of American law. Portions of it have been turned into 
memorabilia, tattoos, and other forms of identity expression.  
Dutton’s next question is one of style. Is United States Code formed 
according to “rules of form and composition?”114 Within the limited class 
of persons who have worked on United States Code (only four Counselors 
have been appointed since 1974)115 there is clearly some sense of recognized 
rules of form. Dutton highlights that style “may derive from a culture, or a 
family, or be the invention of an individual” and may “involve borrowing 
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and sudden alteration [or] slow changes.”116 Stylistic consistency among the 
four Counselors of the OLRC is enough for this artistic feature to be 
recognizable in the Code. Although questions of whether a style exists may 
be different from questions of the attractiveness of a style, the recognition 
of a style is important because it is the foundation of uniform revision of an 
art form. By understanding that each new Counselor creates their own 
simulacrum of the ideal Code, future Counselors can try to adjust the style 
of the Code to better appeal to the American populace.  
In a broader sense, United States Code and the Constitution both 
represent the larger artform of legal construction. As legal documents, both 
occupy a style117 distinct from traditional literature. Distilling the positives 
and negatives of legal style is the first step to amplifying the positive 
attributes of artifacts within the category. Regardless, this universal is well-
fulfilled by both documents which increases the ability of future artists to 
participate in their revision. 
Next, Dutton considers the importance of the existence of a mode or 
tradition of criticism in the aesthetic value of an art piece. If United States 
Code is capable of being criticized utilizing a well recognized “critical 
vocabulary,” then it is easier for it to be appreciated and rejected—
something necessary for developing community appreciation.118 This is true 
for two reasons: first, without an intelligible, critical discourse about an 
artifact it loses an important connection to the intrinsic human need to 
rationally judge activity; and, second, without criteria for “excellence, 
mediocrity, competence/incompetency, and for failure” it is nearly 
impossible to discern the value of an artifact.119  
The OLRC states that the purpose of restating Statutes at Large into 
United States Code is to better conform the existing law along criteria such 
as: improved organizational structure, relevancy, clarity, consistency, 
technical correctness, and conformity with congressional intent.120 
Therefore, if a Statute at Large is entered into positive law and fails to be 
organizationally clear and technically correct, or happens to be out of step 
with congressional intent, United States Code is failing its purpose (which 
speaks to its role as an artifact). The OLRC via its mandate has created an 
intelligible critical language for United States Code, meaning that the Code 
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conforms to this aspect of Dutton’s aesthetic universalism. The Constitution 
seems lacking in this aspect. Partially because of the American attitude 
against criticizing much of the document, there seems to be an absence of 
critical language about the document specifically. However, constitutions 
generally, and legal documents more broadly, have a robust parlance 
associated with their criticism that the Constitution and the Code 
comfortably fit within. Like the criteria used by the OLRC, many legal 
documents are scrutinized because of their ambiguity, relevancy, 
understandability, and more. When combined with an analysis of stylistic 
consistency, it is easy to see where aesthetic criticism can be used to 
improve the Code by scrutinizing its failings and reforming it in line with 
the positive attributes of its style.  
Dutton’s next universal is imitation. An “art object . . . represent[s] or 
imitate[s] real or imaginary experience[s] of the world.”121 How well an 
imitation represents its principle is typically how we assess its value.122 
Humans rationally connect representations with the objects thereby 
imitated, and Dutton argues that the significance of imitation “extends into 
all areas [of] human intellectual life.”123 United States Code is essentially 
an imitation of the Statutes at Large. By revising the Statutes into positive 
law, United States Code becomes a better version of the statutes. Since 
onlookers can assess United States Code against the original Statutes at 
Large, it is possible to assess the representational value of the Code against 
its source material. Therefore, despite the Code not being an imitation of a 
real or imaginary “experience of the world” in a colloquial sense, it is still 
a successful imitation of something.124 United States Code not only exhibits 
this important universal artistic feature, but it does so exceptionally well. 
Even when compared to the Constitution, it would be hard to suggest it 
might better represent American statutory law. The Constitution, as 
mentioned before, is essentially a successful distillation of Enlightenment 
thought, and carries much of its aesthetic value from its ability to be a 
catalyst for that era of western political philosophy. The Code, however, is 
a continued project in improvement and imitation, something the 
Constitution cannot claim to be.  
Finally, Dutton determined that art is more aesthetically pleasing when 
it has a “special” focus. This seems to be the Code’s greatest failing and 
why it is so inaccessible. To be “special” something must be bracketed off 
from ordinary life. Artifacts are “often imbued with intense emotion and 
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sense of community.”125 This is a characteristic of aesthetic universalism 
that is near universally recognized in the Constitution. The Constitution is 
so tied to the American national identity that American military services 
members must swear to defend the Constitution.126 Not only is the Code 
denied the same respect in the oath of enlistment, but the general laws of 
the United States are likewise denied such treatment. This intense emotional 
and cultural investment in the Constitution means that Americans not only 
find it hard to criticize the document, but often simply refuse to do so. This 
in turn bleeds into how actively Americans attempt to understand and access 
the document. The extreme feeling of banality (or disregard) displayed 
toward the Code by the general public and its association with the perceived 
failings of our legal system combine to remove it from such a special place.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This special place problem is the one most critical to address if there is 
any hope of making the Code into the kind of artifact that Americans will 
want to seek out. This, and many of the issues presented in the Kantian 
perspective, are intrinsically linked to cultural perspectives on United States 
Code. Because the Code is considered a normal, uninteresting part of the 
American experience, people have not made the same strides to access and 
understand it that they have the Constitution. The Code will still be viewed 
as occupying a place in society that only lawyers or legislators ought to 
access even if it is made more pleasing to the senses through improvements 
to its website or physical layout; made easier to understand (better font 
choices or clearer language); and is better developed stylistically. As a niche 
piece of legal art and a continuing project, it can be considered the apogee 
of codification, but this does not help the broader American public. 
The best possible outcome would be to use this recognition of its major 
aesthetic failing to initiate a shift in how American civic education is done. 
By teaching that United States Code is as special alongside the Constitution 
and discussing it in similarly reverential terms, Americans may be more 
likely to seek it out. This effort naturally ought to begin with the youngest 
Americans, because the same system that can successfully inculcate within 
them an interest in the Constitution can do the same for United States Code.  
This is also a necessary first step to resolving major issues of legal 
literacy in the United States. The Code and how it is enforced more 
immediately impacts the daily lives of Americans than the Constitution, but 
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it is rare that anyone, (excluding lawyers and judges) ever pour through any 
part of United States Code.  
Finally, practical reforms in the Code’s presentation can help with the 
lesser issues of providing non-utilitarian pleasure, increasing the sensory 
value, etc. The website United States Code is hosted on, for example, is 
antiquated, awkward, and difficult to navigate, especially when compared 
to other archival sites or legal search engines. For example, developing an 
easy-to-browse, free mobile app would help Americans access the Code in 
a manner much less daunting than wandering through a law library or 
Boolean searching through the Code website. Quick and comfortable access 
is key to helping Americans navigate their day-to-day interactions with 
federal law. Educational games or examples of how the law is applied, such 
as those present in the Restatements of common law or textbooks, make it 
easier to understand complicated statutes, even for children.  
These changes and others are of course easier proposed than 
implemented. United States Code, unlike the Constitution, is a daunting 
collection of statutes that will never be relevant to any but a specific niche 
of American commerce, or the criminally accused. The practical benefit to 
any American may feel disproportionate with the difficulty, especially when 
lawyers and legislators have a vested interest in gatekeeping the law for the 
sake of their own pocketbooks. Simply convincing the legislature to expand 
the OLRC for the sake of increasing legal literacy may be an insurmountable 
task.  
Aesthetic facelifts are also largely subjective even when based on a 
weave of objective criteria and may not provide universal answers. That 
said, the task is still one worth encouraging, and hopefully one day, 
undertaking. The people most reliant on proper understanding of the law are 
often indigent. Taking a novel approach to reforming the law is not only a 
worthwhile risk, but also one necessary if we are ever going to encourage 
an increase in legal literacy. 
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